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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEAN FRED VENORD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030284-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether counsel for the Defendant rendered deficient performance which fell 
below an objective standard of professional judgment and that the deficiency was 
ultimately prejudicial by introducing Defendant's prior criminal history, including his 
previous incarceration for a year at the Salt Lake County Jail? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct.App.1998). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory provisions is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Venord appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court after being convicted on Assault by a Prisoner, a third degree 
felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On July 11, 2002, Jean Fred Venord was arrested on a warrant. (R. 4) The warrant 
was ordered on June 13, 2002, after a Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of, and 
Motion for an Arrest Warrant was filed on the same day. (R. 1-2) An Information was 
filed by the Utah County Attorney's Office on June 18, 2002, charging Venord with two 
counts of Assault by a Prisoner, both third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-5-102.5 (R. 5) Venord appeared pro se on July 15, 2002 on a Return on 
Bench Warrant hearing, where bail was set at $3,000.00 cash or bond. (R. 7) A Felony 
First Appearance was scheduled for August 6, 2002, where Venord was appointed a 
Public Defender and the Court instructed Venord that if he wanted to address bail, his 
Counsel could file a Motion to Address Bail. (R. 16-18) The Public Defender, Deborah 
Hill, indeed filed a Motion to Address Bail on August 7, 2002. (R. 20) On August 9, 
2002, Public Defender Hill filed a Withdrawal of Counsel, due to a conflict that existed 
within the Public Defender's office. (R. 22) Mr. Phil Danielson subsequently appeared 
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with Venord as the Public Defender on August 13, 2002, where bail was reduced to 
$2,000.00 cash or bond, and a Preliminary Hearing was set for August 27, 2002. (R. 23-
25) 
On August 27, 2002, Venord waived his right to a Preliminary Hearing and an 
Entry of Plea hearing was set for September 10, 2002. (R. 36-38) At the Entry of Plea 
hearing, Venord requested a Jury Trial setting that was scheduled for September 25, 
2002. (R. 39-41) 
On September 25, 2002, a jury trial was held before the Honorable Gary D. Stott. 
Venord was convicted by the jury of one count of Assault by a Prisoner and acquitted of 
the other count of the same charge. (R. 99-102) 
Between the time of Venord's conviction and his sentencing date, Venord filed 
some pro se motions; Motion to Request and Subpoena the Video, Tape, and Transcript. 
Court Trial, (R. 213-216), Application to Proceed Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit for 
Incarcerated Pro Se Plaintiffs, (R. 219), Writ of Habeas Corpus, (R. 220-226), Official 
Notice, Pursuant Title 63 Chapter 30, Section 10, Sub-Section 2, Clauses 3, 4, 5, 7, 12 
and 14, (R. 227-232), Civil Claim, (R. 233-235), Writ of Habeas Corpus Proceeding, (R. 
239-240), Affidavit on Refusal to Sign Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy by Utah 
County Jail, (R. 252-255), and a Motion to Request Written Transcript of a Videotape of 
the Jury Trial. (R. 279-281) On February 26, 2002, The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield 
dismissed all Motions and Requests made by the Defendant pro se, due to the fact that 
Defendant had Counsel to represent him. (R. 294-298) 
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After Defense Counsel found inconsistencies on the Pre-sentence Report that was 
prepared by Adult Probation and Parole, an evidentiary hearing was set for sentencing 
purposes. (R. 205-207) Venord was sentenced on February 26, 2003. Based on Venord's 
conviction of a third degree felony, he was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the 
Utah State Prison, not to exceed five years. Venord was given credit for time served in 
the Utah County Jail and he was placed on probation for 36 months with supervision to 
be provided by Adult Probation and Parole. (R. 294-298) 
Venord filed a notice of appeal on March 28, 2003 (R. 311-312). Subsequently 
this matter was transferred to this Court pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Officer Peter Quittner 
Officer Quittner testified that he was an employee of the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office where he worked in the processing of inmates at the Utah County Jail. (R. 347 at 
67) Mr. Quittner identified the Defendant in the courtroom as an inmate whom Quittner 
booked into the jail on February 15, 2002. Quittner also stated under direct examination 
by the State that the Defendant was located in the booking area, while being processed, 
and that Michael Phillips and Brady Carnes were also in the same waiting area. (R. 347 
at 67) Quittner went on to testify that he witnessed the Defendant punching both Phillips 
and Carnes. (R. 347 at 74-75) 
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Testimony of Officer Darren Durfey 
Officer Durfey testified that he also was employed by the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office on February 13, 2002. (R. 347 at 102) Durfey also identified the Defendant in 
Court as the individual whom Durfey saw punch Carnes several times in the waiting area 
of the booking facility in the Utah County Jail. (R. 347 at 104-107) Durfey also stated 
that Carnes had contusions on his forehead and cheek area after being assaulted by the 
Defendant. (R. 347 at 108) 
Testimony of Sergeant David Steele 
Sergeant Steele took the stand, identified the Defendant in the court room, and 
testified to having seen the Defendant assault Carnes in the Utah County Jail, where 
Steele was employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Office. (R. 347 at 112-113) 
Testimony of Jean F. Venord 
At trial, the Defendant waived his right not to testify and was put on the stand by 
Defense Counsel. (R. 347 at 119-139) During direct examination of the Defendant by 
Defendant's Counsel, the following exchange took place: 
Q: Okay. Now, on this particular instance that we are talking about in 
February of this year, you were taken to the Utah County Jail. Do you recall 
that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Prior to that time, had you ever been in jail before? 
A: Yes. 













I was in jail in 1998 for a possession charge. 
Possession of-
— a controlled substance. 
Okay. And how long did you serve in jail for that charge? 
A year. 
Okay. And that was all the whole time in Salt Lake County? 
Yes, it was. 
Okay. All right. When you were brought to jail this time, what - why were 
you brought to jail? 
It was a warrant for shoplifting. 
A shoplifting charge? 
Yes. 
(R. 347 at 122-123) 
From this exchange, Counsel for the Defense revealed four (4) facts that 
prejudiced the jury against the Defendant; 1) that the defendant has a criminal history 
involving drugs; 2) that this history was severe enough to warrant a one year commitment 
to the Salt Lake County Jail; 3) that the Defendant also has a criminal history of 
shoplifting, and 4) that a warrant was issued against the Defendant said shoplifting. None 
of this information was brought up by the State during the State's presentation of its case 
in chief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By introducing Defendant's prior criminal history, to include his 
incarceration for a year at the Salt Lake County Jail, counsel for the Defendant rendered 
deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of professional judgment 
and that the deficiency was ultimately prejudicial to the Defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCING DEFENDANT'S PAST CRIMINAL HISTORY INTO 
EVIDENCE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct.App.1998). To prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1) that counsel's performance 
was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient 
conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. 
Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (requiring that defendant show counsel's 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the case). 
1. Counsel's Introduction of Otherwise Inadmissible Evidence of Defendant's 
Criminal History was Objectively Deficient. 
To satisfy the first part of the test, defendant must overcome the "strong 
presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance," Crosby, 927 P.2d at 
644, by persuading the court that there was no "conceivable tactical basis for counsel's 
actions," Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542 (emphasis added); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 
104 S.Ct. 2052 (indicating that counsel should be given wide latitude in making tactical 
decisions). The court "give[s] trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and 
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will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." 
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644. 
Furthermore, in reviewing an alleged deficiency in counsel's trial performance, 
this court "must 'indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome 
the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered 
sound trial strategy." "' State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065) (citation omitted). 
Therefore, before this court would reverse a conviction based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, this court must be persuaded that there was a "iack of any 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." Id. (quoting State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 
688, 692 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)); accord State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993). 
Put another way, "[i]f a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, [the 
court] will assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
During the State's case in chief, no evidence was introduced regarding the 
Defendant's criminal history. It wasn't until after the State had rested and the 
Defendant's own Counsel was directly examining Defendant that Counsel brought out 
the Defendant's history of past criminal convictions of shoplifting and possession of 
controlled substance, Defendant's prior substantial jail sentence, and the fact that the 
Defendant had previous warrants for his arrest. (R. 347 at 122-123) The introduction of 
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the Defendant's criminal history by his own counsel prejudiced the jury and had no 
possible reasonable basis for supporting a tactical trial strategy. There exists no 
reasonable defense strategy that can be articulated that involves admitting into evidence 
damaging information about the Defendant's criminal history, especially when our own 
Utah Rules of Evidence provide the Defendant a certain protection by keeping out 
evidence which is irrelevant, Utah R.Evid. 402, evidence of other crimes or wrongs, Utah 
R.Evid. 404(b), or even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury.... Utah R.Evid. 403. In this case, the State never even attempted introduce such 
evidence, probably because they knew that upon the objection, the evidence would not be 
allowed in. The lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions in this case 
overcome the strong presumption outlined in Garrett "that counsel's conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 849 P.2d at 579 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065) (citation omitted). It is clear that 
Counsel's performance in this case was deficient, satisfying the requirements for the first 
prong of the ineffectiveness argument. 
2. A Reasonable Probability Exists that but for the Deficient Conduct 
Defendant Would have Obtained a More Favorable Outcome at Trial. 
But for the Defense Counsel's introduction of the Defendant's criminal history, 
the jury would have not been presented prejudicial evidence against the Defendant and 
the jury would have returned a more favorable outcome. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Venord asks this Court to reverse and remand to the 
Fourth District Court for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this V±_ day of May, 2004 lA. 
iM&AHv&s 
R. Paul t(Dusty" Kawai 
Counsel for Appellant 
M. Paig 
Counsel for Appellant 
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UTAH CHIMIN AL CODE 76-5-102.8 
Sexual abuse of a child — Aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child 
Sexual offenses against the victim without 
consent of victim — Circumstances 
Applicability of sentencing provisions 
Circumstances required for probation or sus-
pension of sentence for certain sex offenses 
against a child 
Applicability of par t — "Penetration" or "touch-
ing" sufficient to constitute offense 
Reserved 
Corroboration of admission by child's state-
ment 
Child victim of sexual abuse as competent 
witness 
Admissibility of out-of-court s tatement of child 
victim of sexual abuse 
Custodial sexual relations — Custodial sexual 
misconduct — Definitions — Penalties — 
Defenses 
Custodial sexual relations or misconduct with 
youth receiving state services — Definitions 
— Penalties — Defenses [Effective until July 
1, 2004] 
Custodial sexual relations or misconduct with 
youth receiving state services — Definitions 
— Penalties — Defenses [Effective July 1, 
Part 5 
HIV Testing — Sexual Offenders a n d Vict ims 
Definitions 
Mandatory testing — Liability for costs 
Voluntary testing — Victim to request — Costs 
paid by Crime Victim Reparations 
Victim notification and counseling 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substan-
tial risk of bodily injury to another 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor 
V3) Assault is a class A misaemeanor i5 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to an-
other, or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowl-
edge of the pregnancy 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused 
yused serious bodily injury to another 2003 
-^-5-102.3. Assault against school employees. 
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or 
/ivate school, with knowledge that the individual is an 
•P^iployee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of 
, j£ authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A misde-
eanor 
(2) As used in this section, "employee" includes a volunteer 
1992 
n>' 
_^-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer — Penalty. 
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge 
,-^at he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting 
.jthin the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of 
£lass A misdemeanor 
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or 
.other correctional facility, a minimum of 
P A R T I 
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
"Pnsoner r defined [Effective unti l J u l y 1, 
2004] 
rposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who 
o^dy of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or 
unfilled m a jail or other penal institution or a facility 
confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the 




2004] P r i S ° n e r W d e f i n e d [Effective J u l y 1, 
P ^ ^ ^ ^ a ^ « ^ t t p T \ s o - i i e ^ means any person who 
ned mP e a C1 0 f E ° e r p u r s u a n t t o a l a w M arrest or 
. ^ a jail or other penal institution or a facility 
4 ? d e l l n quen t juveniles operated by the 
| l S ~ S t l C e S e r V 1 C e s r e ^ d l e s s of whether the 
* - ^ 2003 
tult. 
^ l l ^ ^ 1 f°rCe °r ™ W ' t0 d° 
^ ^ b S ? i a n i e d b y a S W o f ^ m e d i a t e force 
^ bodily mjury to another, or 
a^( 
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense, and 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense 
(£\ The. CA\J3± m a ^ suspend, the. vm^c^\tvcK\. <«: ^&<33&U&L Q£ 
JMO. sentence required under Subsection (2) if the court finds 
>Jiat the interests of justice would be best served and makes 
.pecific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the 
. eCOrd 1998 
70-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause 
v^dily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree 1974 
7#-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional officer. 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material 
0f any other substance or object at a peace or correctional 
$icer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 1994 
7^-5-102.7. Assault against heal th care provider and 
emergency medical service worker — Pen-
alty. 
(1) A person who assaults a health care provider or emer-
gency medical service worker is guilty of a class A misde-
eanor if 
(a) the person knew that the victim was a health care 
provider or emergency medical service worker, and 
(b) the health care provider or emergency medical 
service worker was performing emergency or life saving 
duties withm the scope of his authority at the time of the 
assault 
C2) As used m this section 
(a) "Emergency medical service worker" means a per-
son certified under Section 26-8a-302 
(b) "Health care provider" has the meaning as provided 
in Section 78 14 3 1999 
76-5-102.8. Disarming a peace officer. 
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally 
^ k e s or removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm 
from the person or immediate presence of a person he knows 
X5 a peace officer 
(1) without the consent of the peace officer, and 
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of 
his authority as a peace officer 1999 
LT-H RULES OF E^ .DENCE Rule 401 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY 
AND ITS LIMITS 
T? ile 401- Definition
 Gf "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
e
 r e probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is disprove the existence of any "material fact " 
f deral rule, verbatim, and is comparable m Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" 
hstance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence 
nq71) but the former rule defined relevant 
11Hence as that having a tendency to prove or 
accords with the application given to former 
Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court State v 
Peterson, 560 P2d 1387 (Utah 1977) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Burden of proof 
Discovery 
Effect of remoteness 
Relationship to crime charged 
Victim's testimony on defense theory 
fited 
Burden of proof. 
The defendant failed to meet his burden to 
lay the necessary two-part foundation of rele-
vance to admit evidence of the witness's health 
history offered for the purpose of attacking the 
witness's credibility, because he did not show 
that the witness's mental health disorder im-
paired the witness's ability to accurately per-
ceive, recall, and relate events, nor did defen-
dant offer evidence tha t the disability was 
contemporaneous with the witness's observa-
tions or testimony State v Stewart, 925 P 2 d 
598 (Utah Ct App 1996) 
In a prosecution for rape, it was not error to 
exclude testimony of defendant's expert on Jap-
anese cultural values since its only relevance 
was to the credibility of the victim, not any 
elements of the crime, and defendant did not 
lay a proper foundation for its admission State 
v Fmlayson, 956 P2d 283 (Utah Ct App 1998) 
Discovery. 
Defendant's stipulation that she would not 
use a vehicle valuation comparison at trial 
removed any need plaintiff might have had for 
information useful to impeach that document 
The mformation sought was therefore irrele-
vant and undiscoverable Major v Hills, 1999 
UT 44, 980 P 2d 683 
Effect of r emo tenes s . 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility Terry v 
pons Coop Mercantile I n s t , 605 P 2 d 314 
vUah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
McFarland v 
(Utah 1984) 
Skaggs Cos , Inc , 678 P 2 d 298 
Relat ionship to crime charged. 
Evidence of nicknames, chants, and dances 
by defendant and his friends, which was not 
remote in. either t ime or place and provided 
background for the rape charged, was admissi-
ble State v Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P3d 985 
Victim's tes t imony on defense theory. 
In a prosecution for attempted aggravated 
murder arising from an incident m which the 
defendant, while a passenger in an automobile, 
thrus t a gun at a police officer after the vehicle 
was stopped for a traffic violation, the court 
properly excluded testimony as to whether the 
officer had ever heard of people pulling guns on 
police officers m an attempt to commit suicide, 
as any such knowledge by the police officer was 
not relevant to the defendant's state of mind at 
the time of the incident and as the defendant 
was allowed to present his theory of "officer 
assisted suicide" by other means State v 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P2d 177 
Cited in State v Gray, 717 P2d 1313 (Utah 
1986), State v Nickles, 728 P2d 123 (Utah 
1986), Meyers v Salt Lake City Corp , 747 P 2 d 
1058 (Utah Ct App 1988), Fisher ex rel Fisher 
v Trapp, 748 P2d 204 (Utah Ct App 1988), 
Belden v Dalbo, Inc , 752 P2d 1317 (Utah Ct 
App 1988), State v Worthen, 765 P2d 839 
(Utah 1988), State v Maurer, 770 P2d 981 
(Utah 1989), State, In re R D S , 777 P 2 d 532 
(Utah Ct App 1989) Whitehead v American 
Motors Sales Corp , 801 P2d 920 (Utah 1990), 
State v Pascual, 804 P2d 553 (Utah Ct App 
1991), State v Larsen, 828 P2d 487 (Utah Ct 
App 1992), State v 633 E 640 N , 942 P2d 925 
(Utah 1997), State v Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 
U T 5 9 , 6 P 3d 1120 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
n c e 1983>a985 Utah L Rev 63, 78 
united States v Downing Novel Scientific 
evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah 
L
 Rev 839 
ALR. — Admissibility of evidence of ab 
sence of other accidents or injuries at place 
where injury or damage occurred, 10 A L R 5th 
371 
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case 
that victim was threatened by one other than 
defendant, 11 A L R 5th 831 
Rule 402 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 648 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible-
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of Compiler's Notes . — The Utah rule also 
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi- adds the words "or the Constitution of the state 
dence (1974) except that prior to the word of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United dence (1974). 
States" have been added. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Discretion of court. 







Standard of review. 
Cited. 
Discret ion of court. 
The trial court is given considerable discre-
tion in deciding whether or not evidence sub-
mitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
While relevant evidence is generally admis-
sible, a trial court has broad discretion to de-
termine whether proffered evidence is relevant, 
and the appellate court will find error in a 
relevancy ruling only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 805 
R2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
In a personal injury action, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence 
of plaintiff's prior injuries because they were 
relevant to the issues of causation and dam-
ages. Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939 
P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Effect of remoteness . 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984). 
Harmless error. 
Even if the admission of testimony regarding 
the ammunition and firing status of firearms 
used in the commission of a crime was errone-
ous, tha t error was harmless where the defen-
dant objected only to the first attempt to admit 
the evidence and failed to raise an objection to 
the admission of the testimony from later wit-
nesses, since the evidence would have been 
before the jury and the reviewing court could 
not say there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 
35, 999 P.2d 7. 
Irrelevant evidence . 
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another 
participant in the crime had no bearing on 
defendant's guilt or innocence and was properly 
excluded as not relevant to defendant's partic-
ipation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 
586 (Utah 1983). 
Other crimes. 
In deciding whether evidence of other crimes 
is admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court 
must determine (1) whether such evidence is 
being offered for a proper, noncharacter pur-
pose under tha t rule, (2) whether such evidence 
meets the. requirements of Rule 402, and (3) 
whether it meets the requirements of Rule 403. 
State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837, 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164,120 S. Ct. 1181,145 
L. Ed. 2d 1088 (2000). 
Probabil i ty evidence . 
Courts have routinely excluded probability 
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to 
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical 
conclusion ra ther than to analyze the evidence 
before it and decide where t ruth lies. State v. 
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
Relevance . 
In an action arising from a motor vehicle 
accident in which the sole issue was the extent 
of damages, evidence tha t the defendant was 
not injured in the accident was relevant as an 
indicator of the severity of the accident. 
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 
109, 992 R2d 969. 
Defendant's statements to one individual 
tha t he would be better off killing his wife than 
divorcing her, to his girlfriend that his wife was 
going to have an "accident/' and to another 
individual asking him to kill his wife were 
relevant as they tended to demonstrate defen-
dant had a plan, intent, and motive to kill his 
wife. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115. 
Scientific evidence . 
The Frye test (that scientific tests still in the 
experimental stages should not be admitted in 
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced 
from a well recognized scientific principle or 
discovery is admissible if the scientific principle 
is sufficiently established) is a valid test, 
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for 
determining when scientific evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted and is not incon-
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with Ru^s 402, 403, and 702 of the 
^
t e I 1 o jp« of Evidence Kofford v Flora, 744 
J t f lK ^ah 1987) 
dard of review. 
S**** judgment of the trial court admitting or 
i ding evidence will not be reversed unless 
^ hown that the discretion exercised therein 
l t l S been abused Terry v Zions Coop Mercan-
tile I n s t , 605 P2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled 
on other grounds, McFarland v Skaggs Cos , 
Inc , 678 P 2 d 298 (Utah 1984) 
Cited m State v Larsen, 828 P2d 487 (Utah 
Ct App 1992), Salt Lake City v Alires, 2000 
UT App 244, 9 P 3 d 769, Campbell v State 
Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 2001 UT 89, 432 
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zure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitu-
tions The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L Rev 
751 
Note, Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and Grue-
some Photographs Is a Picture Worth Anything 
in Utah?, 1996 Utah L Rev 1131 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evalu-
ation test results or of statements made during 
test, 47 A L R 4th 1202 
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior 
misidentification of accused m connection with 
commission of crime similar to that presently 
charged, 50 A L R 4th 1049 
Products liability admissibility of evidence of 
absence of other accidents, 51 A L R 4th 1186 
Thermographic tests admissibility of test 
results m personal injury suits, 56 A L R 4th 
1105 
Criminal law dog scent discrimination line-
ups, 63 A L R 4th 143 
Products liability admissibility of experi-
mental or test evidence to disprove defect in 
motor vehicle, 64 A L R 4th 125 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary 
bloodstains, 66 A L R 4th 588 
Admissibility, m prosecution for sex-related 
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal 
fluids, 75 A L R 4th 897 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or en-
hanced testimony, 77 A L R 4th 927 
Admissibility of DNA identification evidence, 
84 A L R 4th 313 
Admissibility m evidence of composite pic-
ture or sketch produced by police to identify 
offender, 23 A L R 5th 672 
Admissibility of results of presumptive tests 
indicating presence of blood on object, 82 
A L R 5th 67 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of t ime. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The 
change m language is not one of substance, 
since "surpuse" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403 See 
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 
403 indicating that a continuance in most in-
stances would be a more appropriate method of 
dealing with "surprise" See also Smith v 
Estelle, 445 F Supp 647 (ND Tex 1977) 
(surprise use of psychiatric testimony m capital 
case ruled prejudicial and violation of due pro-
cess) See the following Utah cases to the same 
effect Terry v Zions Coop Mercantile I n s t , 605 
P2d 314 (Utah 1979), State v Johns, 615 P2d 
1260 (Utah 1980), Reiser v Lohner, 641 P2d 93 
(Utah 1982) 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
balancing test 
Bias 
Blood soaked clothing 
^hildhood sexual experiences 
^rcumstantial evidence 
^onfusion of issues 
Credibility of witness 
J^mulative evidence 
^termination of admissibility 
disability benefits 
Expert testimony 
Extent of damages 
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trai t 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
a n accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trai t of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and 
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the 
accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence tha t the 
alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such, 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance 
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, 
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998; November 1, 2001.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Provisions 
of this rule apply to character evidence to prove 
conduct, as distinguished from proof of charac-
ter where character is an essential element of a 
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see 
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was compa-
rable See also State v. Day, 572 P2d 703 (Utah 
1977) (character evidence as to the character of 
the victim of a homicide was admissible to 
rebut the defendant's contention that the de-
ceased was the aggressor). One significant dif-
ference between this rule and Rule 47, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there is no 
provision for the use of character evidence in 
civil cases, except where character is the ulti-
mate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 autho-
rized the use of character evidence m civil cases 
not only on the ultimate issue but where other-
wise substantively relevant. See Boyce, Char-
acter Evidence: The Substantive Use, 4 Utah 
Bar J. 13,18-19 (1976). However, Rule 48, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly excluded 
character evidence with respect to a trai t as to 
care or skill. The Advisory Committee to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence concluded that the 
remaining justification for the admission of 
character evidence was so insignificant that 
character evidence in civil cases should not be 
admitted unless it was in issue. 
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v. 
Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce, 
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5 
u t ah Bar J. 31 (1977). 
The 1998 amendment abandons the addi-
tional requirements for admitting evidence un-
der Rule 404(b) imposed by State v. Doporto, 
935 R2d 484 (Utah 1997). It clarifies tha t 
evidence of other crimes^ wrongs, or acts, of-
fered under 404(b), is admissible if it is relevant 
for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirement of Rules 402 and 403. 
Utah's existing Rule 404 is otherwise identi-
cal to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 404 and 
the equivalent rule in most other states. This 
amendment to the rule is not intended to de-
part from the meaning and interpretation given 
to the equivalent rule in other jurisdictions, but 
to return to the traditional application of Rule 
404 prior to Doporto. 
Rule 404 is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 
verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the notice 
provisions already in the federal rule, add the 
amendments made to the federal rule effective 
December 1, 2000, and deleted language added 
to the Utah Rule 404(b) m 1998. However, the 
deletion of that language is not intended to 
reinstate the holding of State v. Doporto, 935 
R2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be 
admitted under Rule 404(b) must also conform 
with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible. 
Amendment Notes . — The Supreme Court 
of Utah, by emergency rule, effective February 
11, 1998, amended this rule by adding the last 
sentence to Subdivision (b). See the Advisory 
Committe Note above explaining the amend-
ment. 
The 2001 amendment added the language 
beginning "or if evidence" in Subdivision (a)(1); 
inserted "alleged" before "victim" four times in 
